ABSTRACT Content-centric networks are designed as potential candidates for future 5G networks and the Internet. In these kinds of networks, contents are queried, searched, and routed on names that people are interested in. Collecting names that a person queries in a content-centric network can violate his/her privacy. As more and more people are concerned about their privacy in daily life, it is desirable to present privacypreserving protocols for content-centric networks. Currently, many schemes are designed to protect people's privacy but few of them consider the malicious behaviors of the transmitting routers, especially when the routers collude with a certain user. We discuss a kind of attack called collusion name guessing attack where intermediate routers collude with a certain user to perform a name guessing attack in order to expose people's privacy. It is shown that present schemes cannot resist such kind of attack, which will be a new challenge for content-centric networks. A new scheme with anonymous user identity and limited key validation time is designed to fight against the collusion name guessing attack. In the scheme, the users are anonymous and the shared keys are valid within a specified time period so the adversary does not know whose packets should be collected and it is infeasible to precompute the name matching datasets during the valid time period of the key. Moreover, slow matching for all users and all time periods needs enormous storage and will last a long time, which will make the attack cost-ineffective.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current Internet is experiencing a tremendous transformation from browsing widely for resources to pulling and pushing on-demand contents. A study of Netflix [1] shows that on-demand video streaming accounts for up to 30% of the peak download traffic in US. With the rapid development of the Internet, new requirements emerge from the trend of scalable content querying, searching and distributions. People's habits of using Internet lead to the popularity of content-centric services and designing of new networking architectures.
Content-centric networking (CCN) [2] or Informationcentric networking (ICN) [3] is designed as informationawareness networking candidate for the architecture of future networks including 5G networks and Internet. It focuses on information retrieval and dissemination. In network layer of CCN, the main forms of packet are interests and contents. People's interests are expressed as names in packets. A user sends his/her requesting packets containing name to the routers, and the routers search name-matching contents in their caches or transmit requesting packets to related service providers if no appropriate content is found. By operating optimally on naming packets, CCN can aggregate the requests for the same interest, and delivery information to the corresponding destinations by multicasting. We can notice that in CCN the routers should know each person's interests by the names in packets before they can look for matching contents. Then, a malicious user can eavesdrop on all the packets passing by on the forwarding router that he/she controls. By compiling enough requests, he/she can possibly build up an accurate picture of a person's tastes and interests. People may be embarrassed or teased if the private information is disseminated and abused. Thus, certain methods should be designed for CCN so that personal private information can be protected.
Recently, there are many schemes [4] - [11] designed to protect privacy in CCN. Schemes in [4] - [6] focus on protecting names in CCN. Protecting names is not enough since a malicious user still can know the interests by checking the returned contents. Schemes in [7] - [11] focus on protecting both the names and the contents. Scheme in [7] is not efficient by mixing irrelevant content with the real content to confuse the eavesdroppers, which will cause heavy communication overhead. Scheme in [8] encrypts names and contents as does in Tor, and it uses ephemeral circuit for each session so the performance is not efficient. Later, scheme in [9] protects names and contents in long-term circuit for each session so the efficiency is improved. In scheme of [10] , packets are forwarded in encrypted form. Each smart router decrypts the packets to match the interests, and encrypts the packets to the next hop if the packets need to be forwarded. However, compromised routers in schemes of [8] - [10] still can collect people's interests, since the matching is in plaintext. Scheme in [11] designs an information lookup scheme that routers cannot fetch information from the packets. However, it cannot resist collusion name guessing attack performed by a transmitting router and a user together. If a router colludes with any user, it can identify the encrypted names in the interest requesting packets. In this paper, we study this kind of attacks in which intermediate routers collude with certain user to perform name guessing attack so as to expose other people's privacy. After the description of the collusion name guessing attack, we mainly focus on the following challenges.
A. RESEARCH CHALLENGES

C1
Can the previous privacy-preserving schemes still protect people's privacy under the collusion name guessing attacks? C2
What kinds of schemes are affected by the collusion name guessing attacks? C3
Assuming the existing of the collusion name guessing attacks, what kind of methods can be taken to protect people's privacy?
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
We try to address a problem existing in content-centric networks. Our contributions are listed as follows:
• We describe the attack model of the collusion name guessing attack, in which the an intermediate router can collude with any user to perform interest names guessing attack to other users.
• We show a practical collusion name guessing attack to scheme in [11] . We also analyze the collusion name guessing attack formally and show that exact matching schemes cannot avoid such kind of attack.
• We present a new scheme to fight against the collusion name guessing attack, by employing anonymous identity and time-bound matching key. Our scheme is built on base of an exact matching method, so the adversary can still try the collusion attack. However, it is now difficult to find out the targeted user, so the matching time is greatly extended. We analyze the proposed scheme on the time and storage consumption for the attack, and the result shows that the scheme is helpful to resist such attacks.
C. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II the collusion name guessing attacks to existing schemes are described and a formal analysis of collusion name guessing attack is presented. After that, we discuss the challenge left by the collusion name guessing attack and a new scheme is presented in Section III. Conclusion is given in Section IV. 
II. COLLUSION NAME GUESSING ATTACKS TO EXISTING SCHEMES
The system model of the collusion name guessing attack is shown in Fig. 1 . There is a trusted key management center (KMC) that generates parameters for the system and keys for all parties. The user can fetch information from the information service providers (ISP the name-guessing matching and try to find out what the user's favorite topic is. Many privacy-preserving schemes are described in [8] - [11] to protect both names and contents. These schemes can be evaluated as secure schemes under the models described by [12] . However, the schemes in [8] - [10] are not secure against compromised routers (or compromised smart routers in [10] ). And scheme in [11] does not consider the collusion name guessing attack. In actual applications, corrupted router can collude with certain user easily, since the adversary can join the system with no barrier. In other words, the collusion name guessing attack is quite possible in actual applications but it is not considered in many security models [12] where the adversaries are not allowed to query encryption or matching oracle on the targeted message. With the help of colluding user, the router can fetch much information about users' interests. Collusion name guessing attacks to existing schemes are shown in the following subsections.
A. COLLUSION NAME GUESSING ATTACKS TO EXISTING SCHEMES
The routers in [11] cannot fetch information from the packets since the names and contents are concealed with a blinded factor. But if a router colludes with any user, it can identify all names in encrypted form. Thus, the scheme cannot protect users' privacy under such attack. We describe names matching process in the scheme briefly and then the collusion name guessing attack. Some algorithms are omitted for brevity and readers can refer to [11] for detailed scheme. Some notations are listed in Table 1 .
1) THE NAMES MATCHING PROCESS OF THE SCHEME [11] IN BRIEF
• Init(λ) With the security parameter λ, the key management center KMC generates the system parameters, with the public paramters Params = (G, g, q, f ) and the private master key MSK = (x, s). In the parameters, G is a subgroup (with order q) of Z * p and prime numbers p and q satisfy q|p − 1. f (·) is a pseudorandom function, and s and x are randomly selected from Z * p .
• KeyGen(MSK ,i) For each user of index i, KMC chooses randomly x i 1 ∈ Z * q and computes
is sent to user i and (i, x i 2 ) to CCN nodes. Similarly, (x j 1 , s) is sent to service provider of index j and (j, x j 2 ) to CCN nodes.
• Interest Request(e, i) If user i wants to generate an interest requesting packet for the name e, it computes σ = f s (e) where σ is the output of e under the function f with the help of secret s. The request is td * i (e) = (t 1 = g σ , t 2 = g x i 1 σ ).
• Content Generation(e, D, j) If service provider j answers an interest requesting packet with content D under the the name e, it computes σ = f s (e) and the encrypted name in content packet is td * j (e) = ( • Name Re-Encryption(i, td * i (e)) Any CCN node receives (i, td * i (e)) can compute re-encrypted matching item M 1 = t 1 x i 2 · t 2 = g xσ , where M 1 can be used for matching names and the contents packets in cache. The names in contents from the service provider are re-encrypted similarly to provide the content matching ability.
• Name Matching(M 1 , M 2 ) Given M 1 from the re-encryption of user i's interest name and M 2 from the re-encryption of the name in service provider's content packet, the matching is performed by checking whether M 1 is equal to M 2 .
2) THE COLLUSION NAME GUESSING ATTACK Suppose some user issues an interest requesting packet with an encrypted form of name e 1 , and some ISP replies with an encrypted content D 1 . After caching D 1 , the router can obtain from the colluding user the ability of generating interest requesting packets with interest name e i from the set of all possible names, says N ALL . If some e i matches D 1 , the router decides e 1 = e i and the interest name is recovered. The collusion name guessing attack is feasible in scheme [11] and future schemes that are using exact matching method. We show the collusion name guessing attack to the scheme of [11] as an example. For instance, we assume that the corrupted router re-encrypts certain user's interest packet to obtain a value M 1 = g xσ , with σ = f s (e) for some name e, and the corrupted router wants to identify e. By colluding with any user j to compute many rounds of Interest Request and Name Re-Encryption algorithms, the malicious router can try to compute all possible M 2 = g xρ and test if M 1 = M 2 , with ρ = f s (c), ∀c ∈ N ALL where N ALL is the collection of all names in [13] . The complete set of M 2 can be precomputed in leisured time so the names identifying can be much faster. We perform a test on how much time it needs to search through the all the names listed in [13] .
On a standard notebook (Intel Core i5-3210M CPU, 8 GBytes DDR3 SDRAM, SATA 500GB Disk, Windows 7 OS), we test a set of names listed as file ''unibasicn-names-2014-08'' in [13] with Crypto++ program within Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 IDE. The file is roughly 115 GBytes and contains 2,144,314,011 names. As the pseudorandom function f is not specified in [11] , we choose SHA-256 [14] as the function f and f s (m) is defined as f (s, m) where s and m are concatenated as input of f . Our computation shows that it costs roughly 3436 seconds to match 10,000,000 names, so it will cost roughly 736786 seconds (204 hours 40 minutes) to match 2,144,314,011 names and roughly 3113722 seconds (865 hours) to match all datasets of content names. We call this normal matching process as slow matching. If the outputs of the g xρ , ρ = f s (c), ∀c ∈ N ALL are pre-computed, our computation shows that it costs roughly 152 seconds to match 10,000,000 names, so it will cost roughly 32593 seconds (9 hours 32 minutes) to match 2,144,314,011 names and 137743 seconds (38 hours 16 minutes) to match all datasets of content names. We call this matching process with pre-computation as fast matching. These data are listed in Table 2 . Moreover, as indicated in [13] , the datasets of content names contains many duplicates (about 51%), so it will cost much shorter time to match the datasets that contain only unique names. In a word, the collusion name guessing attack is currently practical.
Readers may wonder if there are any names that are not included in the datasets, so the matching will be useless. Concerning the promotion of information services, many information service providers will frequently publish and update a dataset of names that people are interested in, such as Google Trends [15] and Baidu Index [16] . We can estimate that the ISPs will also publish and update a full dataset of names in future CCN, and people can easily obtain a complete set of information keywords from all providers.
B. FORMAL ANALYSIS ON COLLUSION NAME GUESSING ATTACKS
In many schemes, only exact matching is considered in names matching of cache lookup. When a proxy router finds a matching between a name N a from interest requesting packets and another one N b from content packets, it means N a = N b . In that case, a colluding user can generate as many interest requesting packets as possible so that he/she can help the corrupted router to decide what names are inside some user's interest requesting packets. Here, we formally prove that if a cache lookup scheme is using exact matching methods, the collusion name guessing attacks do exist.
Definition 1 (Exact Matching): For any name e, td * i (e) is the encrypted name in interest requesting packet generated from e by user i and td * j (e) is the encrypted name in content packet generated from e by information service provider j. A scheme SC is said to be an exact matching scheme, if td * i (e) and td * j (e) of a same name are fed to an honest router and the probability of the router outputting a mismatching result is less than a negligible number (λ).
It can be denoted as
We can observe that scheme in [11] is an exact matching scheme, since both td * i (e) and td * j (e) lead to a same value g xσ where σ = f s (e).
Theorem 1: Assuming the scheme is using exact matching method, the encrypted name from a user is certain to be identified by the collusion name guessing attack, if it and the guessed encrypted name of the attack are from the same name.
Proof: Suppose there is a name e which cannot be identified by the collusion name guessing attack. It means that a user i generates td * i (e) in the Interest Request(e, i) algorithm and a service provider j replies with td * j (e) in Content Generation(e, D, j) algorithm, where the matching operation in an honest router outputs mismatch. Thus, for this e, |Pr[Match(td * i (e), td * j (e)) = mismatch]| is not negligible. That will raise a contradiction to the exact matching definition.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME AGAINST COLLUSION NAME GUESSING ATTACKS
In this section, we present a data sharing scheme for content centric networks against the collusion name guessing attacks. We first describe our idea and define the cryptographic tools that will be used, and then the detailed scheme.
A. OUR IDEA
As we discuss in previous section, slow matching in collusion name guessing attack needs much more time than fast matching with pre-computing datasets, so we can find some methods to make it difficult to perform fast matching. It will cost much time for the adversary to pre-compute datasets for VOLUME 5, 2017 fast matching, so if we change the matching key materials before the adversary finishes the pre-computation and then the adversary cannot perform the real-time fast matching. Thus, if periodical key updating is employed, the adversary has to store the data for the targeted user and perform the slow matching later. If the user's identity is anonymous and is not fixed, the adversary will lose the target and has to spend enormous storage and massive time to match all the data. It will be impossible when the data are accumulated to a certain extend.
Therefore, our idea is adding periodical identity randomizing and key updating methods into Asghar et al.'s scheme [11] . There is a trustful key management center (KMC) in the system and there is a pool of redundant identities for the users. When a user wants to use the content centric service, he/she contacts KMC to obtain a fresh identity and key. After using the service for a period of time, a user can similarly request a fresh identity and key from KMC. KMC will generate new keys for the used identities and transfers them to all routers in leisured time, so there is no need of real-time updating for the routers.
B. CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOOLS
We need two cryptographic tools to construct the proposed scheme, including a public key encryption scheme and a digital signature scheme. These schemes are used to provide authentication and secure data transferring between a user and KMC (or between an ISP and KMC), and the using details are omitted for brevity.
• Public Key Encryption Scheme. It can be any efficient secure public key encryption scheme which can be denoted as the tuple (ES-SETUP(1 λ ), ENC PK (·), DEC SK (·)). Given a secure parameter λ, ES-SETUP(1 λ ) can generate parameters for the scheme and then public/private key pair (PK , SK ) for each participant. ENC PK (·) means encrypting something with key PK . DEC SK (·) means decrypting something with key SK . For instance, encryption schemes such as Elgamal [17] and elliptic curve cryptography [18] can be used.
• Digital Signature Scheme. It can be any efficient secure digital signature scheme. The scheme can be denoted as the tuple (DS-SETUP(1 λ ), SIG CK (·), VER VK (·)). Inputting a secure parameter λ, DS-SETUP(1 λ ) can output parameters for the scheme and signing/verifying key pair (CK , VK ) for each participant. SIG CK (·) means signing some message with key CK . VER VK (·) means verifying certain signature with key VK . For instance, signature schemes such as [19] and [20] can be used.
C. THE SCHEME
The proposed scheme consists of ten algorithms named as (System Initialization, Key Generation, Service Identity Refreshing, Interest Request, Content Generation, Name Re-Encryption, Name Matching, Content Re-Encryption for Caching, Content Re-Encryption for User, Content Decryption). They are denoted as (SysInit(·), KeyGen(·), SysIDRef(·), IntReq(·),ContGen(·),NamReEnc(·), NamMatch(·), ContReEncCache(·), ContReEncUser(·), ContDec(·)) respectively and defined as follows.
• SysInit(λ) With the security parameter λ, the key management center KMC generates the system parameters, with the public paramters Params = (G, g, q, h, f ) . In the parameters, G is a subgroup (with order q) of Z * p where prime numbers p and q satisfying q|p − 1. h and f are two different one-way pseudorandom functions where h(·), f (·) : Z * p → Z * p . Suppose there is a set S of users in the system, and there is a pool N of pseudo identity for the users where |N | |S|. It means the number of identities is much larger than that of total users, so that the identities are enough for periodical identity renewal. In addition, KMC also runs ES-SETUP(1 λ ) and DS-SETUP(1 λ ) to generate public parameters PP for the secure public key encryption scheme and the secure digital signature scheme. Then public/private key pair (PK , SK ) and signing/verifying key pair (CK , VK ) are generated for each participant, namely (PK KMC , SK KMC ), (CK KMC , VK KMC ) for itself and (PK i , SK i ), (CK i , VK i ) for a user or service provider with index i ∈ S in the system. The private key and signing key are transferred to each user through secure channels.
• KeyGen() In the first time period T 1 , KMC selects two keys (x T 1 , s T 1 ) randomly from Z * p . For each pseudo identity of index j ∈ N , KMC chooses randomly x (j 1 ,T 1 ) ∈ Z * q and computes
is saved for pseudo identity of index j and (j, x (j 2 ,T 1 ) , T 1 ) is transferred to all CCN nodes in leisured time before the identity is put into use. After that, only a key evolving factor θ is needed for each CCN node to compute the keys for next time period. θ is described in the following algorithm.
• SysIDRef() When a user or a service provider enters the system in the first time period T 1 , he/she invokes an identity refreshing request to KMC. The request is signed by the user using his/her signing key and then encrypted in KMC's public key. KMC will send him/her a fresh random pseudo identity with key, says (j,
where j ∈ N is random and currently unused in the pool. This pseudo identity with key is signed by KMC and encrypted with the user's public key. A fresh random value θ is selected from Z * p which will be used for key evolving. Two keys (x T 2 , s T 2 ) for the next time period T 2 are randomly selected from Z * p . (θ , T 2 ) are securely sent to each CCN node before entering time period T 2 , and the key for each pseudo identity j ∈ N in all routers will be computed as (j,
is calculated in KMC and saved for pseudo identity with index j which is valid in time period T 2 . In each time period, a user can refresh his/her identity and corresponding key after finishing a certain number of interest requests.
Since the number of pseudo identity is much more than enough for the users, the key refreshing will not affect the periodical identity randomizing and key updating for current users. It is required that the user changes his/her network addresses such as MAC address and IP address when the identity is renewed so as to avoid being linked from the old identity to the new identity, as described in [21] . T 1 and T 2 should have a small overlapped period so that the key evolving will not cause abrupt service stop. In the overlapped time period, the keys for both periods can be used. The packets can easily be recognized since they contain the information of time period, which is described in the following algorithms. The refreshing operations for other time periods are treated similarly.
• IntReq(e, i) If user with pseudo identity i wants to generate an interest requesting packet for the name e during time period T 1 , it computes σ = f s T 1 (e) and the request is td
. Interest requests for other time periods are treated similarly.
• ContGen(e, D, j) If service provider j answers an interest requesting packet with the name e in time period T 1 , it computes σ = f s T 1 (e). The encrypted name in content packet is td * j (e) = (
. Content generations for other time periods are treated similarly.
• NamReEnc(i, td * i (e)) Any CCN node receives (i, td * i (e)) of time period T 1 can compute
σ , where M 1 can be used for matching interest names and cached contents. The names in contents from the service provider j are re-encrypted similarly to provide the matching ability. The operations for other time periods are treated similarly.
• NamMatch(M 1 , M 2 ) Given M 1 from the re-encryption of user i's interest name and M 2 from the re-encryption of the name contained in service provider's content packet, the matching is performed by checking whether M 1 is equal to M 2 . If they mismatch, the router turns to other cached packets. If they match, the content packet will be processed further as described in the following algorithms ContReEncCache(·) and ContReEncUser(·).
• ContReEncCache(j, PE * j (D)) Any CCN node receives (j, PE * j (D)) of time period T 1 can compute (d 1 )
is saved to cache together with the output of name re-encryption. The operations for other time periods are treated similarly.
• ContReEncUser(i, PE cache (D)) Before sending to user i, the CCN node that holds PE cache (D) can compute
is sent to user i. The operations for other time periods are treated similarly.
• ContDec(i, PE i (D)) Given PE i (D) from the router, user i can decrypt the content by computing
The operations for other time periods are treated similarly.
The conceptual procedure of the proposed scheme is shown in Fig. 2 .
D. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security of the proposed scheme will be discussed in two parts, namely semantic security against outside adversary and security against the name guessing collusion between a corrupted router and a certain user. We assume that the corrupted router obtain only the ability of generating interest requesting packets from the user.
1) SECURITY AGAINST OUTSIDE ADVERSARY
Theorem 2: The proposed scheme is semantic secure against outside adversary assuming the scheme in [11] is semantic secure against outside adversary.
Proof: In the proposed scheme, the forms of the encrypted names and contents are the same as in [11] . If there is any outside adversary can break the semantic security of our scheme, the adversary can be used to break the semantic security of scheme in [11] . The corresponding security is proven in Theorem 1 of [11] . Hence this Theorem holds.
2) SECURITY AGAINST COLLUSION NAME GUESSING ATTACKS
Now we discuss the security against collusion name guessing attacks in which corrupted routers colluding with any user attempt to recover the interest names of other user. The keys are updated for each new time period, so the adversary cannot generate pre-computed datasets for fast matching method beforehand. In regard to slow matching method, assuming that a targeted user's each interest name is randomly distributed in the whole datasets of [13] , it will cost roughly 865 hours for the adversary with a computer similar to the one used in experiments of section II-A to match about 10,024,831,333 names. We also assume that the leakage of an interest name will be harmless to the user a hours after the name was used. Since the pseudo identity is randomized frequently, the adversary should guess a user's identity amongst |S| users. Thus, in ideal case the adversary can recover a useful interest name for a correctly guessing user with probability about a/(865|S|) (Three instances are shown in Fig. 3 by setting a = 24, a = 72 and a = 365 respectively) . If the adversary considers only a special target user and he/she knows little about that user, it will be much more difficult to perform such attack after accumulating a lot of captured data. For instance, if the target user requests information only once in a week and there are β time periods, γ requests in that week, it will cost the adversary 865 · β hours to generate pre-computed datasets for fast matching preparation, 1283·β GBytes space to store the datasets and additional 38·γ hours for the matching. An instance of time and storage cost is shown in Fig. 4 by assuming that the time period evolves once per hour and users in the system issue 100 requests per minute. Hence, the proposed scheme can alleviate the collusion name guessing attacks.
E. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
Compared with the scheme of [11] , our scheme needs more communication overhead and computation. In each time period, if a user wants to use the CCN service, he/she should obtain a new identity with refreshed keys. And each CCN router needs a value θ to evolve their partial keys. Thus, we need to transfer additionally at most |S| sets of keys and |R| times of the values θ and the new timestamp, where we assume that R is the set of all CCN routers. That is roughly 4|S| + 2|R| elements in Z * p in each time period. As for the computation, KMC needs |N | extra hashing and |N | extra subtracting computations, and each CCN router needs |N | extra hashing computations in each time period. For instance, if each time period lasts one hour, the length of p is 1024 bits, the number of user is 75.5 billions (World Population Prospects 2017 by United Nation) and the number of routers is 75.5 millions (one router serves 1000 users), the additional communication overhead for each second is roughly 10.7 Gbytes. It will be 143 extra bytes for each router. If users are distributed uniformly and the time period is not short, the extra communication overhead is reasonable. The extra computation cost is also reasonable since hashing is not computation-intensive.
IV. CONCLUSION
We discuss a kind of attacks that malicious routers collude with certain user to perform name guessing attack so as to expose other people's privacy. Our experiments show that present schemes cannot resist such kind of attacks, which will be a new challenge for content-centric networks. We make an attempt to fight against the collusion attack by describing a new scheme with identity randomizing method and time-bound matching key, and the evaluation shows that the scheme can alleviate the attacks. 
